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THE LIGENCY TO SOLVE	Director of Central Intelligence
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# **National Intelligence Daily**

Wednesday 11 January 1984

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CPAS NID 84-008JX

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11 January 1984



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
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
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JORDAN: New Cabinet		
The appointment of Minister of Interior Ubaydat as primay dash hopes in the Palestinian community for more equivers.	uitabla	5X1
The US Embassy reports that Ubaydat, a former chief General Intelligence Department, is considered by Palesti Jordanians to be unsympathetic to their interests. They blisupporting restrictive measures, including those imposed on travel between the West Bank and Jordan. One former mayor told Embassy officials that Ubaydat's appointment the wrong signals to Palestinians, who hoped the reconversal time and the properties of the palestinian issues.	nian ame him for last spring West Bank will send all ening of the	5 <b>X</b> 1
Domestic pressure for former Prime Minister Badran's been intensifying. Badran—who had been in office almos continuously since 1976—was extremely unpopular, partikey Bedouin and Palestinian communities.	t outouk with	5 <b>X</b> 1
Comment: Hussein's selection of Ubaydat may have intended to reassure East Bank constituencies that he stitheir interests as essential. Those groups probably are nethe prospect of an expanded Palestinian role in internal nathrough parliamentary participation.	ll regards rvous about	5X1
Other cabinet changes appear to be routine. Although observers had expected that portfolios would be evenly debetween Palestinians and East Bankers, the cabinet constof the latter. The other cabinet members probably were not their ability to do a more effective job, rather than on the origin.	livided ists largely amed for	5X1



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### **EL SALVADOR-HONDURAS: Territorial Dispute**

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El Salvador's territorial claim to the Gulf of Fonseca has strained	
relations with Honduras, but leade <u>rs in both countries will try</u> to	25X1
maintain operational cooperation.	25/1
Honduran officials are angered by an article in El Salvador's new	
constitution that fails to accord Honduras any sovereignty in the Gulf.	
hardliners in the Honduran	
Government are advocating retaliation, including reduced trade and	25 <b>X</b> 1
closure of the Regional Military Training Center used to train the	
Salvadoran military for counterinsurgency operations.	25 <b>X</b> 1
Nonetheless, the officials have assured the US Embassy that they	
will not take drastic measures. Moderates in the government	
recognize that the country's long-term interests are best served by	
continued bilateral cooperation. Tegucigalpa plans to relocate	
Salvadoran refugee camps—suspected of providing aid to the	057/4
Salvadoran rebels—away from the border area, even though similar	25X1
plans have prompted domestic opposition in the past.	
The US Embassy in El Salvador reports that President Magana	
said last month he hoped to propose a solution to the maritime issue	
if he met with President Suazo. Although Suazo recently indicated a	
willingness to meet with Magana, he believes that Magana—a	25 <b>X</b> 1
lameduck—would have little to offer.	
Comment: The basic problem between the two countries	
apparently concerns their interpretation of access to the Pacific. The	
Salvadoran constitutional provision cites a judgment made in 1917 by	
the Central American Court that accords Honduras access through	
the Gulf without any territorial sovereignty. Honduras has never	
accepted that decision, however, and it claims jurisdiction over some	25X1
of the waters and islands in the Gulf.	25/1
2. The manufacture in the walli	
Although the Suazo government continues to view El Salvador as	
insensitive to its domestic political concerns, it is unlikely to provoke	
major disruptions in military, diplomatic, or economic cooperation.	
Nevertheless, Honduras will continue to urge the US to force	25 <b>X</b> 1
El Salvador to be more accommodating on territorial issues.	25X1

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CANADA: Domestic Reaction to Peace Initiative	
Prime Minister Trudeau's peace campaign apparently has had little effect in reducing the opposition Conservatives' substantial lead in the polls over the Liberals.	25X1
A Gallup poll taken in December, one month after Trudeau began his initiatives, showed the Tories supported by 53 percent of decided voters—three points below a similar poll in October. The Liberals were supported by 30 percent, three points above October, and the socialist New Democrats were still supported by about 15 percent. Twenty-seven percent of the voters were undecided.	25X1
Comment: The small change in voter preference indicates that Trudeau's initiative has not yet captured the imagination of the electorate or, at least, that support for his efforts has not meant many new votes for the Liberal Party. Nevertheless, Trudeau is likely to continue his peace campaign because he is personally committed to reducing the danger of a confrontation between the US and the USSR.	25X1
The Prime Minister probably also believes that he has to continue pushing his proposals in order to maintain his credibility. Although he has repeatedly stressed that his goal is to improve East-West relations and not to strengthen his party's election prospects, some Canadian journalists question his motives. A vocal minority of commentators, for example, are suggesting that the Liberals are trying to exploit a "motherhood" issue to close the gap in the polls.	25 <b>X</b> 1
If Trudeau were to drop his initiative soon, the public might consider his critics' view to be confirmed. The Liberals would be rebuked by their parliamentary opposition, and the voters might react negatively in the general election later this year.	25X1
The peace initiative has evolved into somewhat of a burden for the Liberals. Continuing it apparently promises little in election benefits for the party, but abandoning it risks appearing opportunistic.	25 <b>X</b> 1

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### **TANZANIA: Rising Secessionist Sentiment on Zanzibar**

The US Embassy in Dar es Salaam reports that tensions between the mainland and Zanzibar have reached an unprecedented high, raising the possibility of violence tomorrow as Zanzibaris celebrate their Revolutionary Day.	25X1
Longstanding disputes over island autonomy have intensified in anticipation of a constitutional convention scheduled for next month that will address the legal relationship between Zanzibar and the mainland. Senior government officials in Dar es Salaam are privately expressing concern that events on the island will get out of hand tomorrow. Many mainland ministers have decided not to attend the ceremonies.	25X1
President Nyerere has created a special military unit for possible use on Zanzibar. He also has stationed mainland police at key facilities on the island and has sent more troops to its capital.	25X1 25X1
the military has failed to complete the rotation of Zanzibari troops to the mainland. The program was started in April at the request of Zanzibari President Jumbe	25X1 25X1 25X1
Zanzibari troops, who are largely Muslims, have resisted the rotation program because they do not want to leave their homes for the culturally and ethnically different mainland.	25X1 25X1 25X1
<b>Comment</b> : Nyerere apparently plans to take strong action to suppress any civil disturbances on Zanzibar. Mainland military and police personnel on the island probably would easily defeat any secessionist move.	25 <b>X</b> 1
These government initiatives also may dissuade discontented Zanzibaris from carrying through with their plans. Turmoil on the island, however, would further damage Nyerere's position and could encourage more plotting among military elements dissatisfied with his faltering leadership.	25X1

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SURINAME: Labor Unrest Continues		
The labor crisis took a turn for the worse yesterday we bauxite workers again shut down power at the recently retransformer station near the Suralco bauxite plant. The Lareports that approximately 30 police and 100 soldiers were plant after its managers requested protection for the facing response to the shutdown, the government took control of power facilities.	epaired JS Embassy re sent to the ility. In	25X1
<b>Comment:</b> The potential for violence is at the highes the strike began three weeks ago. The striking workers a gather at the plant today, and they could challenge the se	re likely to curity forces	
occupying the power station. Although Army Commande probably still wants to avoid a showdown with the striker		25X1
believe that their recalcitrance has left him no alternative		0EV1
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PAKISTAN: Bhutto's Daughter Released		
President Zia's decision to allow opposition leader B	enazir	


President Zia's decision to allow opposition leader Benazir Bhutto, the daughter of the late Prime Minister, to leave Pakistan and seek medical treatment in Europe reverses his previous position.	25 <b>X</b> 1
Zia had earlier rejected	
advice that Benazir be freed from house arrest because of concern	
that her release would strengthen antigovernment opposition. Zia is	
now trying to persuade the moderate opposition to support his	
formula for national elections that would legitimize his planned	25X1
constitutional changes.	

**Comment**: Zia may hope that exiling Benazir will open the way for moderate opposition politicians—who were unwilling to challenge her leadership openly when she was under house arrest—to support his political initiatives. He probably believes that his success in dealing with the disturbances last fall makes it unlikely Benazir could mount a serious challenge to the regime from abroad before the elections, which may be held by the end of the year. The President is gambling that in the longer term Benazir will lose her political influence.

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<b>USSR-INTERNATIONAL:</b> Concern About Peace Mover	ment	
Soviet officials of the Moscov	w-hacked	25X1
World Peace Council privately expressed embarrassme		20/(1
Council-sponsored Second Vienna Dialogue for Disarma	ament and	
Detente last November failed to attract the number of W political leaders and US Congressmen that attended the		
in February 1982. The large Soviet delegation was busy		
scenes but kept a low profile in the plenary session and	l working	
groups.		25X1
Comment: The poor turnout will heighten the Sovie	ets' concern	
about the prospects for the peace movement in the Wes		
the USSR to make discreet efforts to sustain it. Moscow pro-Soviet Communists in Western Europe to adjust the		
prevent a reduction or redirection of peace movement	activism away	
from the INF issue. The Soviets themselves are playing		
role in the movement to avoid its being further discredi accusations of manipulation by the USSR.	tea by	25X1
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AUSTRALIA: Record Wheat Production		
The Australian Wheat Board projects wheat output in crop year ending next month at 19 million metric tons. The crop is the result of a 15-percent expansion in the area so and the good weather that prevailed during most of the greason. Although harvesting will continue into early February Rustralians already have begun marketing their crop.	ne record wn to wheat prowing	25X1
Comment: Wheat sales this year will reach about 12 a 50-percent increase over drought-reduced exports in 1 sales to Egypt and Iraq, as well as large sales to the USSF already have been made. Wheat exports by Australia, Ca Argentina are expected to show a 25-percent increase in US exports are expected to drop for the second straight	983. Record R and China, nada, and 1984, while	25X1 25X1
DENMARK: Election Results		
Late voting returns indicate that Prime Minister Schlucenter-right minority government will increase its standin parliament from 65 to about 76 seats. It has fallen short, the 88 seats it would have needed to become Denmark's government since 1971.	g in the however, of	25 <b>X</b> 1
<b>Comment:</b> The current ruling four-party coalition—w portfolios Schlueter says he will not change—is likely to I rely on support from both the pacifist, anti-NATO Radica Party and the anti-taxation Progress Party to pass future The Prime Minister has said he will not bring either party	pe forced to   Liberal   legislation.	
coalition, but he almost certainly will try to use negotiation to gain their support on security policy and other key issued.		25X1
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On said Amahada		
Special Analysis		
ARGENTINA: Alfonsin Taking Charge		
President Alfonsin has taken full advantage of the poseuphoria during his first month in office to address importational and foreign policy issues. The left-of-center leader's tought and swift action have been matched by deft political efforts the pace and temper the impact of promised reforms. The thus far have helped prevent a backlash from Argentina's to brokers—the military, the Peronists, and the unions. Beyon however, economic problems coupled with unmet expected possibly a strengthened opposition could result in more set.	nt domestic n rhetoric s to regulate se moves usual power nd midyear, ations and	25V4
challenges to Alfonsin.		25X1
Alfonsin's most visible initiatives—and the most popu among Argentines—have been aimed at curbing the militi redressing violations of human rights committed during the	ary and	
antiterrorist campaigns of the late 1970s.		25 <b>X</b> 1
		25X1
Labor and the Economy		
Alfonsin also is moving quickly with plans to democra unions by holding new union elections. Several local labor who have been courted by the new government, reported pledged to support Alfonsin's union program. Labor milita unable to get support for a strike last month.	r bosses, ly have	25 <b>X</b> 1
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Deveniet deminated unions	25 <b>X</b>
Peronist-dominated unions, will be unable to challenge the President for at least the next six months.  Alfonsin is attempting to mollify the opposition parties further by giving Peronists middle-level government posts and by making a key party leader a presidential adviser on military matters.	25X1
The administration's political initiatives are receiving greater media coverage, but it has been equally active on the economic front. The government has imposed price controls, submitted a major tax reform package, and begun a program of increased public spending to spur a recovery. According to the US Embassy, Economy Minister Grinspun has also begun talks with bankers in the US and has reiterated his willingness to facilitate refinancing some \$18 billion in foreign debt in 1984 and to negotiate a new IMF agreement.	25X1
Foreign Policy	
Alfonsin's fast pace extends to foreign policy. His government has offered concessions to Chile, for example, that could soon lead to a settlement of the Beagle Channel dispute.	25X1
On the Falklands, Alfonsin has tried to appear flexible, but he still supports the military's basic position that normalization of relations with the UK has to be linked with renewed negotiations on sovereignty over the islands. These moves improve his standing, and they may be used to help justify cuts in defense spending and a more limited role for the military.	25 <b>X</b> 1
The announcement in November, before the President took office, that Argentina had mastered uranium-enrichment technology led Alfonsin immediately to reaffirm his intention to assure that the nuclear program is to be for peaceful purposes only. He transferred the program to civilian authority and created a commission to evaluate it.	25 <b>X</b> 1
Alfonsin has been cautious, however, in making any major changes in the nuclear program. He recognizes that it is a source of national pride and that the military has a strong interest in protecting it. The President probably will wait for the commission's report before blocking out the direction of future policy.	25 <b>X</b> 1
Outlook	
Alfonsin's bold style, the conditions conducive to change in Argentina, and the disarray among opponents suggest that the new President probably will continue to have his way over the next six months. The successful transition to democratic rule and Alfonsin's	
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decisive actions thus far, however, have produced ex	tremely high	
popular expectations that will be difficult to satisfy exconditions. They are even less likely to be met after r	ven under ideal	
revenue raising measures probably will be inadequate		
public spending, putting renewed pressure on prices accommodations with labor difficult.	and making	25 <b>X</b> 1
Labor leaders will then be better able to rally the		
challenge economic and union reforms. Even member own coalition, especially the human rights groups, ma		
vigorous prosecution of security officials and embarr		25X1
government if their demands are unmet.		
Anti-Alfonsin sentiments in the military are unlike		
the near future. Officers subject to human rights invepreoccupied with their own difficulties and probably		
conspiracies that could make them appear guilty. Un	rest in the	
military will be likely to grow, although slowly, if Alfor be losing control of the investigations.	nsin appears to	25 <b>X</b> 1
be losing control of the investigations.		
Most officers will grudgingly accept a settlement		
Channel dispute, even with major concessions. On the similar compromises on the Falklands would not be to		
would almost certainly become a rallying point for or	ponents in the	
military. At this point, however, the services are deep many issues and lack a commonly acceptable leader		25 <b>X</b> 1

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